Subjects made magnitude estimations of moving stimuli produced by a 10 X 10 factorial design of distances and durations. Both group and individual data obeyed the bilinear interaction prediction of a simple ratio model. The relation between perceived and actual velocity, as well as the psychophysical contingencies constructed from the marginal means of the design, could be described by a power function with an exponent of about 0.63 as a representative figure. Plotting subjective velocity against physical velocity with either duration or distance as the parameter resulted, respectively, in families of converging psychophysical power functions. Some implications of the results for velocity research, especially the usefulness of specifying the correct metric structure, are discussed.
The perception of the velocities of moving stimuli poses a difficult problem for the student of sensory processes. First, it has been shown to be sensitive to a number of contextual variables (e.g., Henderson, 1971; Semb, 1969 ), yet there has been no systematic attempt to construct a comprehensive account of the relevant interactions (see Anderson, 1981 , on the potential contribution of contextual effects to scaling). Second, although early attempts to determine subjective velocities (e.g., Brown, 1931b; Kohler, Wallach, & Cartwright, 1942; Wallach, 1939) resulted in only a nominal scale, more recent studies differ greatly in the prescribed form of the psychophysical relation. Third, and most important, the role of the component physical variables, namely distance and duration, in the perception of velocity remains unresolved to a large extent.
The present study evaluates some of the psychological processes that occur when people judge velocity. An attempt is made to uncover the ways in which the necessary stimulus variables interact (or fail to interact) to produce a psychological representation of velocity and at the same time to relate these products to the corresponding independent variable(s). The present approach owes much to the theory We thank Harvey Babkoff, Joel Walters, and Elizabeth Segal for helpful discussions and comments on an earlier version of the manuscript.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Daniel Algom, Department of Psychology, Bar-Ilan University, 52100 Ramat-Gan, Israel. of scaling proposed by Anderson (e.g., 1970 Anderson (e.g., , 1981 Anderson (e.g., , 1982 , designated functional measurement, but it makes use of more traditional psychophysical procedures as well.
As noted earlier, various investigators have reached different conclusions about the form of the velocity function. Although recent studies using direct estimation procedures, notably magnitude estimation (e.g., Marks, 1974b; S. S. Stevens, 1975) , showed that subjective velocity could be expressed as a power function of physical velocity, they differ greatly in the size of the corresponding exponent.
1 A glance at Table 1 makes clear that there appears to be no consensus regarding the nature of the relationship between perceived velocity and stimulus velocity as the respective exponents range from below to well above unity. This would mean substantial variation in the operating characteristics of the different subjects' sensory systems unless these disagreements stem from some well documented systematic effects that influence the outcome of the magnitude scaling experiment (e.g., those of stimulus range or standard stimulus; e.g., Poulton, 1968; Teghtsoonian, 1971 Teghtsoonian, , 1973 . In the present case a substantial range effect emerges when we make comparisons across the different experiments. Although magnitude estimation studies of velocity have provided some useful psychophysical information, they are of little useand, indeed, might even be misleading-when dealing with the question of the role assumed in the perception of velocity by the two component variables. The validity of direct scaling techniques relies on the assumption that putative numerical ratios represent actual ratios of subjective velocity, yet this fundamental assumption lacks empirical justification (see Anderson, 1970 Anderson, , 1974 Anderson, ,1982 Curtis, Attneave, & Harrington, 1968; Garner, 1954; Torgerson, 1961) . Moreover, the stimulus in the case of velocity is necessarily denned in terms of the two independent physical variables the interaction of which in perception is of focal interest. However, the unifactor stimulus designs such as are used in current research cannot provide a decisive test of any theory of the way(s) in which distance and duration combine in perception to produce subjective velocity.
In physical terms, velocity is denned as the rate of change in spatial position, that is, as a relation between distance and time. This formal definition of velocity has provided the natural context for an analogous dividing rule of psychological integration (e.g., Brown, 1931a; Rachlin, 1966; Wilkening, 1981) . Given the stimulus dynamics, perceived velocity should be predictable from perceived distance and perceived time (e.g., Drosler, 1978) . However, as noted in the last paragraph, the subject's ostensible numerical response is not necessarily a simple linear transformation of the internal representation. Hence, treating the subject's estimates as the true scale values to be integrated in an equivalent psychological equation of velocity can be ambiguous at best and seriously misleading in most cases. Failure to satisfactorily validate the scale values under concern has adversely affected the work on subjective velocity and at least in one case has led to a categorical rejection of the psychophysical power law (Drosler, 1978) .
Functional measurement methodology (Anderson, 1970 (Anderson, , 1974 (Anderson, , 1982 handles explicitly the rules employed when people integrate information from different dimensions. Moreover, contextual effects regarded as unwanted biases in traditional scaling can be put to good use in scaling within the framework of functional measurement. Finally, unique specification of the model under concern allows construction of at least intervaWevel psychophysical functions. The approach has been successfully applied in the developmental area to study the combination rules used by children and by adults to integrate velocity, time, and distance information (Wilkening, 1981) . However, the stimulus ranges employed in that study were extremely restricted, and the response measure used was marginally quantitative at best. Although integration models could still be specified, no psychophysical function(s) could be extracted under the experimental conditions. A significant feature of the present experiment is the composition of stimuli. Most previous tasks (with a couple of notable exceptions) presented subjects with a set of stimulus events, then scaled successively the velocity, distance, and time information embedded in each stimulus (e.g., Rachlin, 1966) . The present study used a matrix of stimuli in which each of several distances (ranging over 1.4 log units) was combined with each of several durations (ranging over 2.6 log units) to produce a set of velocities ranging over 4 log units. A stimulus set of this type makes possible both a stronger test of a ratio model of stimulus integration and the extraction of reliable psychophysical functions.
Method

Subjects
Ten young men and women (5 of each), all paid volunteers from the University community, served as subjects. Their ages ranged from 19 to 41 years, and none of them had previous experience with the method of magnitude estimation.
Apparatus
The apparatus was built to display a luminous spot (diameter 0.8 cm) moving at a constant velocity for some fixed distance and duration in a circular track (diameter 28 cm). The stimuli appeared on a cathode-ray tube display (Textronics 422) from which they were transmitted and displayed on a larger TV screen<(PYE, 26") by means of a closed video system (Sony 3250CF). The spot had a value of 210 lux, and it appeared on a screen with a value of 150 lux (Lambda LI-170); measurements were made on the surface of the screen. A small digital computer (PDF-11) was used to produce and administer the moving stimuli.
The stimuli were viewed in a dimly lighted room (2.8 m X 1.4 m) in which the only anchoring was the frame of the screen (70.5 cm X 47 cm) showing the luminous dots. Subjects were seated 1 m from the screen, a viewing distance resulting in a visual angle of about 8° subtended by the circular motion of the rotating dot. They were instructed to rest their heads on a chin rest and to fixate on the center of the display. Although the direction of motion was always clockwise, the starting positions were randomly varied from trial to trial.
Circular motion was chosen in the present experiment because it is not limited in duration or distance, whereas linearly moving stimuli are constrained in both of the respective ranges. However, despite an apparent agreement between estimation of circular and linear motion (Rachlin, 1966) , movement distances in the present experiment were limited to less than two complete rounds of the rotating dot. This made the perceptual demand resemble more closely judgments of linear movement and avoid the introduction of unwanted psychological variables (like counting the number of rounds) without seriously limiting the range of producible velocities. In fact, the range of velocities used in the present experiment (over four logarithmic units) was considerably larger than the ranges employed in previous investigations (see Table 1 ).
Procedure
Ten different levels of distance (di-d, 0 : 34.9,69.8, 104.7, 139.6, 209.4, 314.2, 453.8, 628.3, 837.8 , and 1,047.2 mm or from 2° to 60°) were combined factorially with 10 levels of duration (t t -lio-0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16 , 32, and 48 s), making 100 different velocity stimuli in all. (A certain degree of redundancy is evident, though, because different distances and durations may yield constant values of velocity). Stimuli were presented one at a time to the subject for judgment. Each subject received all values of the stimulus matrix in a session and served in five sessions, thus giving five judgments per stimulus in all. A session lasted about 1-1 Vb hr including several breaks at the subject's request. In addition, all subjects participated in a preliminary practice session to become familiarized with both the stimulus setting and the method of magnitude estimation. Order of presentation of stimuli was irregular and different for each subject.
The method was magnitude estimation. Subjects were instructed to assign to the first stimulus whatever number seemed most appropriate to represent its velocity, then to succeeding stimuli to assign numbers in proportion. If no movement was seen, subjects were to assign the number zero (which none of them did). Subjects were told that they could use whole numbers, decimals, and fractions as needed.
Results and Discussion
Pooled Data
We present the group results first. The magnitude estimates of subjective velocity given to each stimulus were averaged geometrically, and these means are plotted in Figure 1 as a function of the log of the distance travelled by the target. The parameter is duration; each contour represents motion exposed for a different constant duration. Assuming (a) a ratio or dividing model is operating on the psychological representations of distance and time transforming them onto subjective velocity and assuming (b) an appropriate judgment function for the magnitude estimation response, the curves in Figure 1 should form a diverging fan of straight lines. The model implies that when durations are held constant, as in Figure  1 , the differences in subjective velocity will increase linearly with increasing levels of distance. Note that the velocity estimates are plotted on a linear scale; this makes it possible to assess by visual inspection the metric im-RELATIVE DISTANCE plication of the ratio model: divergent interaction that is approximately bilinear.
Perhaps the most striking feature of this family of functions is their tendency to diverge from a common origin at the lower left. There is a systematic change in the number of distance units separating the approximately linear functions from one another. These characteristics suggest that the ratio model holds for the present data at least to a first order approximation. Though there appear to be some small departures from bilinearity, the data, taken as a whole, seem to obey the implications of the model under test fairly well.
Analysis of variance of the velocity judgments (performed on the geometric means of the various subjects) confirms the conclusion drawn from the visual inspection of the graphic display. There is a highly significant Distance X Duration interaction, F(81, 729) = 5.1, p< .01, nearly all of which appears in the bilinear component. (Of the overall interaction sum of squares, SSi, 93% is concentrated in the bilinear component.) Although the bilinear component is highly significant, F(l, 729) = 313.4, p < .01, the remainder of the interaction is not (F < 1).
The data were subjected to analysis of variance by yet another procedure because, as Anderson (1982) points out, the interaction in a within-subject data matrix like this might be biased by individual differences. In order to eliminate any subject effect (and to make the error term the Distance X Duration X Subject interaction) each subject's numbers were multiplied by the constant needed to make that subject's mean equal to all the other means (i.e., to the overall mean; see Lane, Catania, & Stevens, 1961; Marks, 1980) . Results of this analysis showed a significant overall interaction, f(81, 729) = 10.35, p < .01, with most of the interaction again concentrated in the bilinear component-92% of the overall SSj, F(\, 729) = 771.8,/J < .01. The remainder of the interaction was insignificant (F < 1). The Linear X Quadratic component for distance and duration (in that order) accounted for 2.8% of the overall interaction SS, and the complementary Quadratic X Linear component explained 1.2% of the same sum. The Quadratic X Quadratic component accounted for only 0.9%-these sample component values are given here for the purpose of illustration and for substantiating the finding of an essentially dividing rule of concatenation of scale values.
Legitimate application of analysis of variance (ANOVA) to the present data might be questioned, however, because it requires that the data have reasonably uniform variance. By contrast, functional dependencies between the means and the standard deviations of magnitude estimates, violating assumptions of AN-OVA, are often encountered in psychophysical research. As a general rule, the standard deviations of these estimates increase nearly in proportion to the means of the estimates (e.g., Marks, 1978 Marks, , 1980 , although a unique transformation that will stabilize the variances can be found in each case (e.g., Bartlett, 1947; Budescu & Wallsten, 1979; Smith, 1976) . The problem is complicated, however, because the particular variance stabilizing transformation chosen may conflict with another monotonic transformation often applied to the same set of data. That transformation is optionally employed in order to maximize fit to a particular model (usually based on the assumption that such a procedure entails a more nearly linear scale). The two classes of transformation, variance stabilizing and scale stabilizing, do not frequently concur in that the optimal operation to obtain one goal is not necessarily optimal for obtaining the other (Budescu & Wallsten, 1979 ; see also Birnbaum, 1982) .
That the results are commensurate with the dividing model (judged velocity = distance/ time) is also evident in the outcomes of the ANOVAS that we, nevertheless, performed on several sets of variance stabilizing transformed scores. The overall interaction (Distance X Duration) was always significant, with most of the interaction appearing in the bilinear component in each case. For instance, applying the logarithmic transformation, Xy = log(Xij), yielded a highly significant interaction term, F(81, 729) = 2.97, p < .01, with 71% of the sum of squares concentrated in the bilinear component.
Nevertheless, despite the variability, the overall form of the functions, together with the lack of any significant systematic deviation from the prescribed theoretical pattern, suggests that the data are bilinear to a good first order approximation. Taken as a whole, the group results are perforce approximately consistent with the metric predictions of the model defined by both (a) the algebraic rules used for the integration of distance and time onto subjective velocity (mimicking the definition of velocity in physical terms) and (b) the task given to the subjects.
As Anderson (1970 Anderson ( , 1974 has pointed out, given a factorial design of the type used in this study and results consistent with bilinearity in the response domain, the marginal means provide estimates of the scale values. Figures 2 and 3 give these calculated scale values of subjective velocity as a function of different distances and different durations, respectively. The function in Figure 2 , produced by averaging across the rows of the data matrix (i.e., across the different durations), depicts subjec- tive velocity as a function of the distance undergone by the moving target. The function ,in Figure 3 , produced by averaging across distances, shows velocity estimates as a function of duration. The fits to the power functions (straight lines iri the double logarithmic coordinates) are excellent (r 2 equals .995 for the distance function and .999 for the duration function). The slopes (exponents of the power functions) are 0.57 and 0.60, respectively. However, the present marginal means define underlying scales unique only up to a multiplication by a (positive) constant and addition of a constant. In order to compare the present results with those reported by other investigators, using unifactor magnitude estimation designs, the "true" zero points of the scales have to be estimated. We accomplished these corrections in accord with the iterative techniques detailed in Mashhour (1964, chapter 3) . The adjusted functions are slightly steeper: The slope of the function relating log subjective velocity to log distance is 0.624 rather than 0.57. And subjective velocity relates to the reciprocal of duration by a power function with an exponent of 0.638. The fits to the corrected power functions are, again, excellent (r 2 s equal .993 and .998, respectively).
Three main conclusions follow: First, (rescaled or unrescaled) magnitude estimates of subjective visual velocity evidence bilinear or ratio structures. Second, regardless of whether the two scales of subjective velocity (one as a function of distance and the other as a function a a 3 RELATIVE DISTANCE Figure 4 . Magnitude estimates of velocity, as in Figure 1 , for 2 of the 10 subjects.
of duration) are exactly the same, they both are clearly compressive (i.e., characterized by exponents well below unity) power functions of their respective physical dimensions. And, third, the psychophysical (power) function relating perceived velocity to the duration of movement appears slightly, though consistently, steeper than the parallel function relating subjective velocity to moved distance. Note that the size of the exponent for duration as the independent variable is larger despite the fact that the range of durations employed in the present experiment exceeded that of distances (see Teghtsoonian, 1973) .
Individual Data
The types of analyses used to obtain the pool results-with the same kind of interpretation-may be applied to the data of each individual subject. Thus, the group data serve as a common frame of reference to evaluate individual cases.
The question of the particular cognitive algebra used may yield to an analysis of the bilinearity evident within each subject's entire response matrix. As Figure 1 shows, the pooled data conform well to a ratio model. So do most (but not all) of the individual data. Visual inspection of each subject's subjective velocity contours-from graphical displays analogous to that shown in Figure 1 (see Figure 4 for two examples)-shows that, despite greater noisiness, in most cases the curves form the expected fan of diverging lines.
Analyses of variance confirmed that the data for 9 of the 10 subjects agreed with a simple dividing model, in that these data had significant interaction terms, with most of the interaction residing in almost all of the cases in the Linear X Linear component. The remainder of the interaction is insignificant in the great majority of the cases. See Table 2 for details.
On the assumption that bilinearity exists at least as a first order approximation, we can derive scale values from each subject's data matrix by calculating marginal means down columns and across rows, adjusting scale values by estimating the "true" zero points of the two scales for each subject. Columns 2-5 and 6-9 in Table 3 show, respectively, for duration and for distance as independent variables, the unconnected and corrected exponents of power functions fitted to the marginal means.
The fits to the power functions are excellent. Given (a) the noisiness in the individual data of the present subjects and (b) a certain indeterminancy of the iterative techniques available, scale corrections made on individual data are a bit risky, and these slopes should be treated cautiously. Note that the variability in both the original and the rescaled exponents is sizeable. These ranges of magnitude estimation exponent-somewhat more than 2:1-are typical (e.g., J. C. Stevens & Guirao, 1964; Ramsay, 1979; see Marks, 1974a) . However, the variability in the corrected data is inflated by the extreme values of two subjects (G and H, whose interaction terms include sizeable nonlinear components), without which the mean duration exponent would rise to 0.57 and the standard deviation would drop by 23% (to .20). Excluding the two subjects would alter the mean distance exponent too, raising it to 0.50, and bring about a considerable reduction in the standard deviation (to 45% of the mean instead of 54%). In contrast, inclusion of the (anomalous?) subject (D), whose data agreed with a simple additive model rather than with a bilinear model, would produce an even larger variance in the individual exponents. In that case the mean uncorrected duration exponent would drop to 0.61 and the mean corrected exponent to 0.44. The distance marginal means would drop to 0.52 and 0.40, respectively.
Still, the most striking feature of the individual data is that subjective velocity grows faster as a function of (the reciprocal of) duration than as a function of distance. Although the difference in exponent is. small, it is nevertheless reliable. The individual velocity functions are remarkably compressive. The average uncorrected magnitude estimation exponent is about 0.6, whereas the average corrected exponent is even somewhat lower.
In sum, the results of the individual data suggest that the rules underlying the integration of stimulus information onto subjective velocity follow a dividing model. Sensory representations of velocity vary somewhat from person to person with normal vision, but the typical underlying velocity scales-as a function of duration and distance-are compressive power functions of the respective physical dimensions (with exponents in the vicinity of 0.6). The psychophysical velocity-duration function usually appears a bit steeper than the parallel velocity-distance function. Taken as a whole, the individual results substantiate the findings from the pooled data of a ratio rule of velocity integration and of the underlying compressive power scale(s).
Velocity Input-Output Functions
The entire data matrix produced in the present experiment (with judgments pooled over subjects) may yield to yet another display that probably is more in line with data presentations usually employed in the unifactor designs found in the literature. Figures 5 and  6 give apparent velocity as a function of physical velocity with duration ( Figure 5 ) and with distance ( Figure 6 ) as parameters. The plots show that for any constant duration or distance, estimated velocity grows as a power function of physical velocity, but the larger the duration or the shorter the distance, the steeper the log-log function. However, the most striking characteristic of these two families of psychophysical power functions is that the members of each family intersect at a common point at the upper right (this pattern is more distinctive, though, in Figure 6 ; see J. C. Stevens, 1974) . That the slopes (exponents of the power functions) and the intercepts of these functions vary systematically with either duration or distance is amply demonstrated in Table 4 , which lists the parameters of the psychophysical functions.
The fits to the velocity power functions are excellent. Moreover, the variation of exponents is systematic and sizeable for both duration and distance as parameters (although some small deviation from monotonicity is evident at the longest durations, t s -tio). Direct comparisons among the best-fitting least squares slopes (by an SAS general linear model procedure; Ray, 1982) confirm statis- Figure 1 . The essential difference between the two graphic displays appears in the spacing of the ordinate: linear in one case (Figure 1 ) and logarithmic in the other (Figures 5 and 6) . The question arises, how, despite the (nonlinear) logarithmic transformation, the same functions still appear linear? Although the apparent discrepancy between the two patterns may be fortuitous, it does pose the possibility of a distinct nonlinear element in the pooled data. Most probably, as a closer examination of the results in Table 2 immediately reveals, the data for at least some of the subjects may not obey a rule of exact division. Thus, although the results taken as whole evidence the properties of a ratio model, this model did not yield a tightly constrained metric (numeric) structure in the present case. Most likely, the logarithmic transformation resulted in the elimination of at least part of the deviations from bilinearity evident in the original data so as to produce a set of diverging curves that are more closely linear.
Let us turn back to the velocity input-output functions in order to get a more analytic The reasonably good fits not only confirm that we are dealing with convergent families but they make another, perhaps even more important, point. Such plots entail a procedure allowing for an objective estimation of the common point of intersection (for details see J. C. Stevens, 1974) . For duration as parameter the convergence takes place at log velocity level of 2.47 (or 294.53 mm/s), whereas the corresponding point for distance turns out to lie at 2.09 log velocity (or 123.61 mm/s).
Given a sensory continuum and a relevant physical variable (e.g., loudness and sound pressure level) several families of converging power functions, characterized by a logarithmic relation between ft and k, may be obtained using different stimulus dimensions as parameters. For each parameter a corresponding point of intersection can be determined within the common system of coordinates. These points may differ, of course, on either the ordinate, the abscissa, or on both dimensions. It may, however, be shown that when the exponent-intercept functions have the same slopes (but different intercept values), their corresponding points of convergence will differ solely along the vertical dimension (i.e., they will lie on the same value of the stimulus). Equivalently, if it is the intercept that is invariant, then the points of intersection will differ only horizontally (i.e., they will assume the same values on the sensory continuum in question).
Examination of the exponent-intercept functions obtained here for duration and for distance as stimulus parameters reveals that the respective points of intersection differ mainly in the stimulus level at which the convergence takes place (the intercept values of these functions are much closer to one another than are their respective slopes). One way to interpret convergence is to treat the stimulus level at which it occurs as signaling the end point (e.g., threshold of pain) for the modality under concern (J. C. Stevens, 1974) . Alternatively, it may mark the point of transition on the sensory axis between one kind of sensory experience and another (see Babkoffj 1978) . Regardless of whether either of the above or any other conjecture is correct, the point of intersection defines a dynamic response range, allowing for yet another (at least ordinal) determination of the psychophysical function. The illustration in Figure 9 , showing the ideal case that the present results approximate, may help clarify this point.
Note that because the ordinate values are approximately equal, the slope of the psychophysical function with distance as the parameter is steeper than the slope of the same type of velocity function with duration as the parameter. This result suggests that apparent velocity grows faster with (the reciprocal of) duration (i.e., when the parameter is distance) than with distance (that is, when the durations are held constant). Again, this relation holds despite the larger range of durations used in the present experiment. Another, perhaps more complete appraisal of the present data taken as a whole, is obtained by plotting mean magnitude estimates against velocity for all the 100 stimuli presented (disregarding the particular duration and distance values as such). Figure 10 is a log-log plot of these velocity judgments averaged over the various subjects. The slope of this psychophysical function for velocity is 0.634, and the fit to the power relation is still excellent (r 2 = .989). The general characteristics displayed in Figure 10 are representative of the data for all 10 observers. Individual exponents, intercept values, and r 2 s appear in Table 5 . In each case, the relation between apparent and physical velocity is well described by a power function with an exponent below unity.
A closer inspection of Figure 10 reveals some slight tendency for deviation from the overall power relation and, in particular, for a shallower slope at high levels. The deviation, though, is rather small, because the single power function drawn over all regions of stimulus level explains close to 99% of the variance. Yet, to get some estimate of the size and nature of the inconsistency, we tried to fit two power functions rather than one to the same set of data. We assessed the stimulus value at the alteration of the slopes first by visual inspection and then by computing the respective r 2 s. Given the arbitrariness of such a procedure, we tested several values as estimates of the point of transition; the stimulus level of 2.5 log units was finally chosen as probably the best estimate of the velocity at the intersection of the line segments. This value produced two psychophysical (power) functions with slopes of 0.70 (r 2 = .995) and 0.45 (r 2 = .975) for the lower and upper segments, respectively. Again, given the subjective determination here of the respective stimulus ranges, these values should be treated somewhat cautiously. Nevertheless, a change in the slope of the psychophysical function does appear in the vicinity of the value mentioned (see Figure 11) . (Other assessments of the respective ranges alter the absolute values, but none of the slopes described above changes appreciably).
Perhaps the simplest way to interpret these results is to treat the two scales as describing two different-rthough related-kinds of perceptual experience associated with the growth of physical velocity. One scale operates on relatively small and moderate values of velocity (characterized by a power function exponent of 0.70), but another, more compressive, scale takes place when subjects are presented with objects moving at faster speeds. Interestingly enough, the stimulus level marking the transition between the two velocity functions approximately coincides with the stimulus levels at the convergence of the families of the psychophysical power functions. The compatibility of the two types of indices seems to provide some evidence that slow velocities are processed somewhat differently than relatively faster velocities. That different perceptual mechanisms mediate judgments at different ranges of velocity has been suggested by several investigators (e.g., Henderson, 1971; Ullman, 1983 ). Yet another indicant of the hypothesized perceptual change comes from spontaneous reports made by subjects about the subjective quality of the apparent motion. The initially clear (then blurred) moving dot lost its approximately circular shape at velocities of about 2.7 log units and beyond, appearing rather as an extending path of light. (Despite that obvious phenomenal change, subjects could still tell both the velocity and the direction of those fast motions; see Pollock, 1953) . Our results may be taken to indicate that there are two kinds of suprathreshold motion perception, divisible on the basis of both the values of velocities involved and the phenomenal nature of the judgmental task at hand.
It is worth noting that the exponent derived from judgments at the lower velocities (0.70) is a bit larger than the exponents derived from either the marginal means of the entire data matrix or from the total range of velocities. Note, further, that the size of this truncated distribution of velocities is more in line with the ranges of stimuli scaled in other studies. Nevertheless, although the exponents obtained herein are compatible with some of the values reported in the literature (e.g., Rachlin, 1966) , they are inconsistent with other studies mentioned in the introduction. One possible resolution is that the considerably larger range of stimuli employed in the present experiment resulted in somewhat lower values of exponent (see Rachlin, 1966; Semb 1969; Teghtsoonian, 1971 Teghtsoonian, ,1973 . Furthermore, some direct procedure studies of velocity (e.g., Eisler & Ottander, 1963; Kennedy, Yessenow, & Wendt, 1972) introduced certain modifications in method, notably in their use of the methods of magnitude estimation. The present study, employing instead a free magnitude estimation task, yielded smaller average exponents (see Ramsay, 1979) .
General Discussion
Cognitive Algebra of the Processing of Visual Velocity
The results of the present study are consistent with the hypothesis of a dividing model operating in the integration of distance and duration information onto subjective velocity. The occasionally significant deviations observed from the implied bilinear structure were neither substantial nor especially consequential to the model analyses performed. Hence, they actually add (in what may seem a paradoxical logic) to the power of the statistical tests used to specify the propriety of the ratio model under consideration (see Anderson, 1982, p. 167) . Moreover, although a logarithmic transformation is usually sufficient to bring an initially converging set of data (i.e., obeying a multiplying model) to display parallelism (Anderson, 1982) , its application to the present data resulted in a pattern that was even more closely bilinear. Finally, the fact that as many as 10 levels were used for each of the stimulus variables of the factorial design provides sufficient power for establishing the (inherently nonadditive) ratio model as characterizing the present set of data.
However, the quantities that interact bilinearly are not the psychological values of distance and duration. Rather, the present dividing structure acts on a set of implicit values operating at an intermediate stage in the processing of visual velocity. These underlying values are clearly different fron the ostensible psychological values of duration and distance. The temptation to assume that a dividing metric operates on quantities that are subjective durations and distances in conjunction with the lack of a proper validational base have beset earlier proponents of a ratio scheme.
The present results imply perforce a crucial distinction. Subjective velocity rests on a certain perceptual relationship between subjective values of distance and duration. The relationship is best characterized as a cognitive analogue of the definition of velocity in physical terms. Yet the operation of the (subjective) components appearing in this relationship is limited solely to judgments of velocity. When the same stimuli (i.e., moving dots) are judged for apparent duration or apparent distance, rather than for apparent velocity, other scales appear that are nonlinearly related to their respective representations in the processing of psychological velocity.
It should be recognized that subjects in the present research were called upon to make velocity judgments only. Nevertheless, it was possible to construct psychophysical scales for both distance and duration as independent variables directly from the marginal means of the factorial design. These velocity scales turned out to be highly compressive power functions of both distance and duration. By contrast, when durations and distances are exposed for judgments of apparent duration and apparent distance (not in the present study) the respective psychophysical functions are roughly linear (e.g., Eisler, 1975 Eisler, , 1976 Krantz, 1972; S. S. Stevens, 1971; S. S. Stevens & Galanter, 1957 ; see Allan, 1979, and Baird, 1970 , for fairly comprehensive reviews of subjective duration and visual length, respectively). Because subjective velocity and apparent distance are both presumed to be power functions of distance, with different exponents for the different tasks, one scale must be a power (i.e., nonlinear) function of the other. The same consideration applies to subjective velocity and subjective duration as a function of duration. It would appear, then, that distance (or du-ration) information is processed differently in judgments of subjective velocity compared to judgments of subjective distance (or subjective duration). Given a moving stimulus, there are, simultaneously, two sets of values for both distance and duration. One set of values operates when judgments of velocity are called for, but another (nonlinearly) related set of values operates when subjects are instructed to estimate the distances or the durations of moving targets.
To cite just one study for illustration, Rachlin (1966) had his subjects estimate the velocities, distances, and durations of a set of moving stimulus displays. Although the power function exponent,for velocity was around 0.75, quite (though not fully) consistent with the present value, the exponents for distance and duration were both around 0.90, contrasting sharply with the presently derived velocity exponents for both distance and duration (both in the vicinity of 0.60). The implication that there are two sets of task-dependent subjective values for both distance and duration seems to follow quite naturally. Jones and Huang (1982) studied two wellknown perceptual phenomena associated with temporal and spatial extent-the so-called tau and kappa effects. Their analysis bears some similarity to the present study, in that Jones and Huang examined factorial combinations of duration and distance in order to specify the correct algebraic models for the psychological processes under study. A power /fit applied to the plot of the marginal means against physical duration (Price-Williams's, 1954, data) yielded a rather low exponent of 0.72, a value that is a bit higher than the comparable exponent from the present experiment (0.64) but disagrees sharply with the close-to-unity exponents usually derived from explicit judgments of duration (see Allan, 1979) . Another function based on the marginal means for length (Huang & Jones's, 1982, data) was more closely linear. (Their values should be treated with caution, though, because no zero adjustments were made.) Although comparisons between phenomena related to apparent and real motion are risky, the agreement found between the respective marginal means' functions (especially for duration) is noteworthy. Notable, too, is Jones and Huang's explanation of the tau and kappa effects in terms of a uniform motion (constant velocity) imputed by subjects to a discontinuous display. Interestingly enough, they demonstrated that most relevant data conform to linear combination models (in particular weighted averaging). This raises the possibility of different algebraic models for apparent and real motion.
The only velocity study, directly comparable in general method to the present one (Wilkening, 1981) , found even for judgments of its adult subjects a subtracting rule of composition (subjective velocity = distance -time). However, as noted in the introduction, neither stimulus range nor the response measure employed in that experiment were satisfactory from a psychophysical angle of attack. In addition, there are important differences in both type of stimulus (animals in Wilkening's experiment) and judgmental task (information about distance and duration was presented in two separate events rather than intermixed into a single stimulus event) between Wilkening's study and the present one. Wilkening's experiment, it should be recalled, was conducted from within a developmental perspective (two of the three experimental groups comprised children below 11 years of age), a context that explains many of the differences in procedure.
The Psychophysical Function
Besides providing the explicit cognitive algebra used when people judge velocity, the dividing model found here plays a vital role in the derivation of the psychophysical functions as well. The present results indicate that the psychophysical function for perceived velocity is markedly nonlinear regardless of whether physical velocity or either of its definitional components is taken as the independent variable.
That subjective velocity is a compressive power function of physical velocity agrees with the conclusion of some, but by no means all, previous investigations. Yet even that part of previous work that has also claimed to find a power relation with an exponent below unity between subjective and actual velocity (e.g., Rachlin, 1966) is suspect because it rests on the assumption that the overt response was (at least) an interval scale of per-ceived velocity in each case. However, as Anderson has repeatedly pointed out (e.g., 1975, 1982) , this assumption may or may not be correct in special cases, and, in general, it lacks needed empirical justification.
Detailed inspection of Wilkening's (1981) factorial plot for the velocity judgments of adults indicates also a compressive psychophysical function; however, three data points are hardly enough to uniquely specify the respective relation. It is noteworthy, perhaps, that a more closely linear relationship between perceived and physical velocity seems to hold for the velocity judgments of the children's groups in that study. Does the psychophysical relation for velocity undergo (nonlinear?) changes at the different stages of development? A similar question with respect to metric structure has been answered in the positive, at least in the case of subjective duration (Wilkening, 1981) .
Further Psychophysical Perspectives
The present results lend preliminary but encouraging support to a differentiation between the roles of distance and duration in the processing of visual velocity. Although a systematic unfolding of the relative effects of distance and duration in the determination of subjective velocity requires an independent study, using probably another type of design (e.g., Lappin, Bell, Harm, & Kottas, 1975) , the present results suggest a somewhat more active role to duration information. One should entertain, however, the possibility that the relative importance of the two stimulus parameters is dependent on level, especially in the face of the presently found converging families of psychophysical functions.
Although the meaning of these convergences is admittedly conjectural, they may suggest that two mechanisms are involved in the process of visual motion registration. Whether the distinction between the two systems is more fundamental than their difference in range is a question to be answered by future experimentation (see Ullman, 1983) .
Finally, the work reported here is relevant to a fundamental question regarding the authenticity of the perception of moving stimuli. The question at issue is whether velocity is perceived directly as a primary visual attribute or whether it is a secondary variable inferred indirectly by noting changes in both spatial and temporal positions of objects (e.g., Lappin et al., 1975; Rosenbaum, 1975) . The present results are consistent with those reported by the studies mentioned, concurring with the conclusion that perception of velocity is both primary and direct-with a qualification. By no means should the "directness" of velocity judgments be taken to indicate an inability to recover either distance or duration information by the observer. On the contrary, the information from both physical dimensions is fully retained, although in a form different from that used in explicit judgments of the two dimensions.
The integration process uncovered in the present research seems to take place wholly automatically (though no claim for direct empirical evidence for this is made here). The components combining in the processing of velocity are not directly available to perception (see Marks, 1979a , for analogous phenomena in loudness). Subjective velocity seems to enjoy the same phenomenal immediacy found with other psychophysical dimensions. Put in the context of some general problems in psychophysics, the present findings are consistent with the notion of several subjective values operating across successive processing stages of a given stimulus (Anderson, 1975; Marks, 1979b Marks, , 1983 .
